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Van Doren: Understanding Unger

UNDERSTANDING UNGER
JOHN W. VAN DORENt

It has been three years since an issue of the William Mitchell Law
Review presented an article on the subject of CriticalLegal Studiesjurisprudence. In Vol. 13, No. 4 (1987), Professor Russell Pannier,of William Mitchell College of Law, offered an overview of the works of
Roberto Mangabiera Unger, a leadingproponent of CLS. In the same
issue Professor Andrew Haines, of William Mitchell College of Law,
presented an article that examined the CLS response to racism.
With the following article by ProfessorJohn W. Van Doren, we return
again to the subject of CLS jurisprudence and again to the works of
Roberto Unger. Professor Van Doren first reviews the CLS critique of
western jurisprudence and then examines Unger's latest conception of
what a better world is and how to achieve it. Professor Van Doren concludes with his own insightful observations on Unger's contribution to
modern legal thought.
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INTRODUCTION

In this article, I will set the jurisprudential context, review
Professor Unger's program for socio-political change as set
forth in his recent trilogy, Politics,' and evaluate it.
As noted by Critical Legal Studies (CLS), Western jurisprudence has served political purposes to provide a false sense of
closure or necessitarian constraint in the arena ofjudicial decision making. 2 By closure, I mean some objective resolution of
dispute, whether based in rules, policy, morals, rights and
principles or tradition. Most Western jurisprudents have, in
that process, obscured questions of transformative social theory. In his recent trilogy, Politics,3 Professor Roberto Unger
1. See R. UNGER, POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987).
There are three volumes: 1) SOCIAL THEORY, ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK [hereinafter
SOCIAL THEORY]; 2)

FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN

SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY

[hereinafter

INTO POWER: COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL POLITICS

2.

SOCIAL THEORY IN THE

FALSE NECESSITY];

[hereinafter

and 3) PLASTICITY

PLASTICITY].

See CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 2 (A. Hutchinson ed. 1989) [hereinafter Hutch-

inson] (noting that disputes in modern jurisprudence are devoted to justifying the
judiciary in liberal democracy).
3. UNGER, supra note 1.
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has revived important questions of social theory in the context
of law as taught in the law schools. He has continued to extend his arguments beyond the law school context to formulate
a theory of social change that serves as a background for his
affirmative program for institutional change.
In Knowledge and Politics4 and other works, Unger explored
the knowledge problem and developed a critique of Western
liberalism based on it. He and other CLS advocates have been
claiming successfully that the professed goals of liberalism cannot be met within the theory of liberalism. 5 Unger has identified as a major problem of classical liberalism the pretense of
closure, i.e., the pretense that legal disputes can be handled
through appeal to neutral or other objectively derived rules or
principles. 6 By focusing on the legal system, Unger continues
to assert that classical liberals had as an objective the preven7
tion of the polis falling prey to a particular faction.
In the United States, liberalism took the form of a separation
of powers, a structuring of government thought capable of curtailing the development of power pockets.8 To prevent special
privileging, we were to be ruled by an impersonal or neutral
law through the legal system. 9 However, legal liberalism attains neither goal. The legal system and law are not impersonal, and a relatively small faction has used the legal system
and political institutions to cement in or freeze a social reality,
thereby perpetuating its control.' 0
Unger, and the CLS Greek chorus, are persuasively undermining the neutral claims of legal Positivists, rights theorists
and others who attempt to provide neutral and objective referents to meet claims of contradiction in the legal order."
4. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 5-7 (1975).
5. See id.; see generally, R. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 561 (1983).
6. See Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental? Implications of Roberto Unger's Uses and
Abuses of the ChinesePast, 64 TEX. L. REV. 915, 965 (1986) (otherwise critical of Unger's
views).
7. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 449 (faction of society has inordinate
control over human and material resources).

8. Id. at 449-50.
9. See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 147; see generally SHKLAR, LEGALISM
(1964), as quoted in W. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE, UNDERSTANDING AND
SHAPING LAW 349-55 (1987) [hereinafter REISMAN & SCHREIBER].

10. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 33, 265.
1I. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 2-4.
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Traditional Western jurisprudence has concealed, either
consciously or not, important questions of social theory.12 The
most important of these is how law and social institutions get
to be the way they are, and how they remain frozen. Much of
Western jurisprudence is apologetics aimed at creating a false
13
sense of closure of the legal and political process.
I.

JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT OF UNGER'S THOUGHT

A.

Positivism

The Western jurisprudence of Positivism, for example,
serves as a vehicle to cement, rationalize, and indicate the necessity for existing social arrangements. "Positivism" is a term
used to refer to a view of law in which stresses that preexisting
rules are what determine results in law cases.14 Positivists may
conclude that there is a discretionary area in law in which rules
do not govern, but the impression left is that it is not a very
significant area.' 5 Positivists hold that the judge resolves the
case based on the application of a preexisting rule because it is
a rule. Thus, Positivist judges do not "peek over" to see what
16
moral or social result the rule will have on the society.
Positivist judges apply the rule because it is a rule in the society, 17 and perhaps because they think that it is difficult to have

a society unless it is governed by rules. An example is what I
call the Monopoly game approach. If there is a dispute as to
how many houses it takes to earn a hotel, we refer to the rule
book, find the answer to be "four," and the problem is solved.
We do not get into debates as to whether it should be three or
five, much less whether Monopoly is a fair game that brings out
the best in us.
Since Positivism stifles disputes about the "game," it can be
used by elites to mask the extent to which the law is in fact
used to perpetuate their interests.' 8 By reference to the al12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw, 130-32, 253 (1961) (life of the
law is determinant rules).
15. Id. at 132 (wide areas of conduct controlled by rules with only a fringe of
open texture).
16. See REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 292 (noting that policy factors are
disregarded by the positivist approach).
17. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 136-37.
18. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 3, 4.
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leged need for rules, Positivists are able to rationalize the exclusion of ideological elements from the top of the iceberg of
legalism. 19 In this way, Positivists seek to avoid political controversy. The term "public policy," for example, may be used
as a judicial technique to rationalize a decision at the outer
limit of the boundary between controversial political dispute
and what is represented as established law. But the "public
policy" admission is as far as the Positivist goes. Positivist oriented judicial opinions do not admit that they may involve
choices from controversial, ideological or political alternatives.
Positivism is the reigning model.20 In this respect it is surprising to read in Unger: "Just about everyone has agreed that
you cannot adequately understand the law as a system of rules
that provides determinant answers to particular problems of
choice." 21 If positivism reigns, is there really such an agreement? "But," continues Unger, "many believe that doubts can
be settled through an appeal to impersonal policies and
22
principles."
Though it makes little difference for Unger's purposes, Unger has missed the point that most professors in law schools
use the formalist, Positivist model. Positivists create closure,
certainty and false necessity where there is none by suppressing dissonant material. How many of us, for example,
brush aside a dissenting opinion? But, just because law is not
like a Monopoly game in which one can easily find rules to resolve controversies does not mean that law is necessarily uncertain. Actually, the legal process contains some certainty,
but it is often falsely assumed that this is because of the application of a preexisting rule because it is a rule, or because of a
belief by officials and others that society could not operate
without rules.
The legitimating myth of liberalism is that law is a neutral
and objective process which resolves disputes. As mentioned
above, formalists stress that preexisting rules resolve controversies because they are rules and because society cannot function without rules. Positivism, which may produce formalist
19. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 271.
20. See, e.g., Kaye, Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism: Two Sides of the Same

PracticalCoin?, 14J. LAw & Soc'Y, 303, 317 (1987).
21. See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 147.
22. This is no doubt a reference to Professor Dworkin. See
note 1, at 147.
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results, has the effect of maintaining the ruling order whether
it be in South Africa 23 or the United States. Once the law has
been enunciated, the moral question fades and obedience is
demanded. But rules or principles often travel in opposing
pairs (e.g., caveat emptor vs. breach of warranty),2 4 and since
there is no rule to determine when stare decisis is to apply, 25
how can the formalist emphasis on rules controlling decisions
2
be true? We hardly even get to other kinds of objectivism

6

which provide alleged closure: Policy Science, Natural Law,
Rights and Principles, Law and Economics, or some elite
power theories. Today, in the law school world, all of these are
perceived as marginal.
Positivism, at its inception, was laudable enough to break us
free of a Natural Law used to perpetuate existing elitist divisions of wealth and power.2 7 It was the voice of emerging
classes challenging privilege, and is an appropriate reminder
of the possibilities of judicial tyranny. But it is a chameleon.
Positivism can be the voice of any status quo, whether tyranny
or democracy. And Positivism in America, while claiming a
false neutrality, provides a cloak of legitimacy to support class
stratification, the suppression of women, Blacks and other
28
minorities.
Positivism has not remained static. As Positivism or "modern Positivism"

29

moves to accommodate critics, the distinc-

tions formerly alleged between Positivism and Natural Law are
increasingly blurred.30 Modern Positivists thus collapse the
distinctions between an older Positivism and Natural Law.
Some Positivists now assert that they are as willing as any to
address the question of morality of a legal regime. They are,
23. See Dugard, Some Realism About the Judicial Process and Positivism-A Reply, 98 S.
AFRICA L.J. 372 (1981); Van Doren, CriticalLegal Studies and South Africa, 106 S. AFRICA

L.J. 648 (1989).
24. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960) (car manufacturer liable in tort; caveat emptor rejected in favor of implied
warranty).
25. See, e.g., E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3 (1949).
26. See, e.g.,
Collins, Roberto Unger and the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 14J. L. &

Soc'v 387, 396-98 (1987).
27. See, e.g., REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 281. See also Kaye, supra note
20, at 308 (noting that dominant theory in feudal times was reactionary natural law).
28. See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 2-4 (system supports white male power).
29. See Mirfield, In Defense of Modern Legal Positivism, 16 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 985
(1989).
30. See Kaye, supra note 20, at 318.
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or say they are, as willing as natural Lawyers to assess the morality of law once the law itself is ascertained. Thus, the Natural Law theorists' assertion that Natural Law may be used to
veto a Positive Law on moral grounds is to some extent
blurred, or merged, with the modern Positivist's willingness to

assess the morality of the same law. 3 '
The Positivist H.L.A. Hart posits a certain minimal Natural
Law content to a society which claims to have a legal system. 3 2
This content includes the protection of persons, property, and
enforcement of promises. But is there any stable government
in the world that does not do that? Thus, the basic minimal
Natural Law content of Positive Law posited by Hart can coexist with numerous combinations of virtue and vice. Positivists
specifically do not concern themselves with the morality of a
given legal system in determining whether it is a legal system. 33
The criteria of validity is the criteria which the system itself
posits. 34 What then is the position on a regime such as that of
South Africa which has volumes of Positive Law duly enacted
by representatives of about four million persons, but which excludes from that process another twenty-four million persons
who are nonetheless bound by those laws?3 5 What is the duty
to obey law in such a situation? Positivists may view this as a
separate question, to which they purport to attach significance.
Positivists may also claim that it is even a separate and important question as to whether a citizen should be civilly disobedi-

36
ent in any regime.
Is law in a society such as South Africa's prima facie valid?
Positivist answers vary. The question of whether Positivist law
is prima facie valid, maybe what remains of the controversy between Natural Lawyers and Positivists. 37 But as the major
Western jurisprudential theories merge, what becomes clear is
that they rest on a false sense of closure, a false necessity, and
31.

See, e.g., H. HART, supra note 14, at 104 (we may question the morality of rule

of recognition, and whether there is a duty to obey).

32.
33.
it is-to

Id. at 189-95.
See id. at 111-114 (only official need accept the criteria of validity-whatever
have a legal system).

34. Id.
35. See Van Doren, supra note-23.
36. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 618 (1958).
37. See J. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 19, 128-38 (1980); see also REISMAN &
SCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 335.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990

7

William
Mitchell Law
Review, Vol.LAW
16, Iss.REVIEW
1 [1990], Art. 2
WILLIAM
MITCHELL

[Vol. 16

none of them address major concerns of social theory. 38 Western jurisprudence often serves to suppress these concerns and
thereby isolate law from politics. The effect of suppression is
that few persons ask the question of how law gets to be the way
it is, or are encouraged to create useful models for change.
The relationship of these major jurisprudential theories to
social theory is thus obscure. Positivists allow that law-conceived as rules-may come from the morality of a society.
Some Positivists say, equally, that law may come from "immorality." 39 Morality is a non-legal source which becomes legal
when duly created according to the way law is created in the
society. But, other than to stress that law may have some origin which can be observed, namely what is enacted through
authorized sources, the Positivist affiant sayeth not.
Perhaps we should follow the suggestions of one author and
not concern ourselves with the epicycles and other fancy footwork of modern "sophisticated" versions of legal Positivism.
40
In his attacks on Positivism in the context of South Africa,
Professor Dugard excludes modern sophisticated versions of
Positivism from his concern. While there is a discussion of
open texture in "modern" Positivism ("open texture" loosely
meaning a more flexible area of law where decisions depend
less on preexisting rules), that part gets left out when judicial
decisionmakers rationalize their conclusions in opinions. The
judicial opinion presents the face of positivism as rigid and unyielding. Lost are the qualifications about open texture, and
the allegedly open questions about the morality of regimes,
and individual rules and principles. What remains is the mind
set of official judicial decisionmakers whose decisions sustain
the status quo. Thus, Dugard finds the more important subject
to be the mindset of official judicial decisionmakers when they
41
rubber stamp the basic elements of the status quo.
The important question becomes how much does the Positivist view of law, that law is rules (thereby downplaying the
38. See Kaye, supra note 20, at 303 (jurisprudential arguments tend to be abstract;
there is a tendency to "talk past" other disputants and avoid addressing genuine
disagreements; and legal philosophy often shuns sociological analysis, lest it be
"taken into the forbidden realms of real life").
39. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 253 (no necessary relation between law
and morals).
40. See Dugard, supra note 23, at 373.
41. Id. at 373-74.
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moral element), make Positivists responsible for political consequences. First, Positivists must not deny that their approach
is ideological and political. Some Positivists may offer the
dodge that they are only describing, and are not making,
normative judgments in picking and choosing what to stress in
the socio-legal arena. 42 When pressed, however, the Positivists
stressing that the legal arena is composed of rules must admit
that the statements they make are normative. Rules conflict,
principles are ambiguous or indeterminate. Here, the Positivist may counter with the open texture description. Positivists
may say that rules have a clear area of application and an open
textured area. Even though open texture exists, the rule is still
there. 43 Open texture is what CLS advocates call
indeterminacy.
The next question is how much of the legal arena is open
textured. The open texture, in degree of importance and frequency, may tend to reduce the closed area to insignificance.
If Positivists admit the presence of too large an area of open
texture, we must then welcome the Positivists to Policy Science, Legal Realism and CLS. At this point, the Positivist may
switch to the normative claim that Positivism is an ideal, and if
44
the system does not operate that way, it should.
However, the degree of uncertainty or indeterminacy in the
system should not be overstressed. As Professor Greenawalt
has reminded us, there is a degree of certainty provided by our
commonly accepted cultural understandings. 45 Even though
language is potentially uncertain, it may be made certain by a
community of interpreters (lawyers and judges), who agree on
what potentially ambiguous language, rules or principles mean
in specific contexts. 46 A degree of "objectivity" is created by
42. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 104-05 (distinguishing between a rule of
recognition as a fact, and whether it is a good rule).
43. See id. at 130 (only a fringe of open texture in a "wide area" governed by
rules).
44. At least one "Positivist" has indicated this in conversation with the author.
See also Miller and Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U.
CnI. L. REV. 661, 663 (1960) (neutral impersonal model is idealized); H.L.A. HART,
supra note 14, at 136 (judges who do not follow the rules will be criticized); Cf. SHKLAR, LEGALISM, as cited in REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 351 (Positivism is an
ideology which makes a choice of political values).
45. See Greenawalt Lecture, Objectivity and Law 12-17 (Feb. 11, 1989) (unpublished drafi)(Professor Greenawalt is presently using this and other writings as a basis
for his manuscript of a book to be published by Oxford University Press).
46. REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 351-52.
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common understandings. Objectivity here means that there is
substantial agreement in a given society on what is meant.
Thus, Professor Greenwalt's example that when a subordinate
is asked to close a door, common understandings make the request knowable. 47 Unger's point would be: note that it is the
subordinate that is asked to close the door! Professor Greenwalt's pronouncements on achieving common understanding
via substantial agreement coincides with Unger's thesis that
there may be a social framework in which routine activities are
performed that may be at any given moment uncontested. 48 In
a different society, however, there might also be substantial
agreement, but of the opposite meaning, or a competing social
framework. 49 As CLS observers maintain, language and communication are society specific and arise contingently.
At this point, several problems may arise. To begin with, the
reason why certain expressions have "objective" content is not
necessarily because language itself has given rise to rules
which carry some objective meaning. Due process, equal protection, freedom of speech or property may mean one thing in
one era and something else in another. The language itself has
not changed. At this extreme, all "objective" can mean is what
societal actors say it means at a given time and place. Jurisprudents are thus seen to move to other forms of objectivism such
as the seeking of closure through consensus. 50 But while it is
possible to look for a consensus (of whom? the people? the
elite? which people? which elite?) at a given time, this is a far
cry from finding something enduring in the language of a legal
standard. Presumably, such "agreements" and "traditions"
are subject to a continuous process of erosion and flux. While
such an area can be referred to as open textured, this takes us
back to the unanswered question in Positivism: how much is
open textured, and how much is rule determined.
Legal texture thus reflects the ambiguity of framework.
See Greenawalt, supra note 45.
FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 58-61.
49. See, e.g., Van Doren, Death African Style: The Case of S.M. Otieno, 36 AM. J.
COMp. L. 329 (1988).
50. See Greenawalt, supra note 45. But see REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 9, at
337 (quoting from The Wolfenden Report (Co-authored by Professor Hart), which
stated that the writers reached conclusions for themselves, rather than basing them
on a "public opinion," which is "often transient and seldom precisely
ascertainable").
47.

48. See
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There is a dominant ideology or framework, and a counter
dominant framework expressed in counter rules and principles, the applicability of which is uncertain. 5'

The question

then arises, why do decisionmakers adopt the mode of ruleoriented decision making? Focusing on the rule and suppressing a counter rule may be done because the decisionmaker thinks that his/her duty is to find rules and at least
appear to use them to decide. A further explanation may be
that adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers requires that judicial decision makers appear to interpret. When
judges decide, allegedly on rules, a serious and unresolved
question surfaces: do they lack candor, i.e., have "scienter"
that they are deciding between competing standards and misrepresenting the process?
Thus, a fundamental problem of Positivism is the perception
of the legal arena as though there were only a single rule for
each situation. The real reason why judges accept a rule may
be moral approval of it, and the place that the rule or principle
holds in maintaining the social framework in which the routine
of production and life occur. Reliance, although a factor in
some cases, 52 may be relatively unimportant. Where reliance is
or is not a factor, it becomes impossible to tell whether the rule
is accepted because it is a rule or because the decisionmaker
approved the morality or the social result of it. Even the judge
may protect herself from such knowledge.
The critic of rule oriented positivism can confirm that a society has a predominant ideology, and it is that submerged water
table that the objectivist has reached in his/her search for objective referents. Let us concede that there is some determinacy. Let us leave the question of whether "due process" (or
Shakespeare) has any inherent meaning. Why should we not
be able to decide that it shall have a certain meaning, look to a
stable group of appropriately oriented interpreters, and plan
accordingly, H.L.A. Hart's designated officials have this internal point of view. They think that the rules, and presumably
the methods and sources from which rules are derived, are appropriate. 5 3 They have this "internal point of view, '

54

just as

51. See Collins, supra note 26, at 406-07.
52. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Ouellette & Sons Co., 352 Mass. 725, 731, 227
N.E.2d 509, 512 (1967) (court states that reliance was important; otherwise it might
have ruled differently).
53. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 1 11-14.
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one who plays squash thinks that those rules are appropriate.
But the Positivist move to agreed upon interpretations may
only be uncovering the dominant ideology (and the same is
true of the policy approach which stresses community policy).
All they show is that there is a dominant ideology and a social
framework which manifests itself in law. Whether it is moral or
immoral is a question reserved by modern Positivists. We do
not know why the Hartian "officials" who deploy rules think
the rules are appropriate. Officials in South Africa may think
the rules and the sources are appropriate because they do very
nicely under apartheid.
The morality of dominant ideologies may be opposed from
society to society just as their dominant rules and principles
may be. The question of legitimacy remains. In other words,
one can find a determinacy and even have decisionmakers simply follow rules because the society needs rules to function.
Such Positivist decisionmakers may not concern themselves
with the morality or the social effect of such rules, and the resulting society may not be one that anyone would approve of
or want to live in. In short, determinacy need bear no relationship to legitimacy.
Similarly, one could have decisionmakers who continually
change the rules, believe in what they are doing and alter rules
because of morality and social effect. They may do so openly,
and still not have a society that one would wish to live in. The
question remains, in what direction are rules being changed,
and according to what values? As long as there is some stability and some change, determinacy and indeterminacy may be
morally neutral in a given context.
The main problem concerning indeterminacy from the point
of view of those who wish to legitimate a social order in the
West is that it is not in accord with the ruling mythology. The
major role played by the alleged application of rules is to reinforce the existing social, political and economic order. 5 5 Part
of the ruling mythology is that law is certain and preexisting,
and not in flux. CLS adherents and Legal Realists claim to
have upset the royal lie. The closed textured area functions in
part to uphold the dominant ideology. It does so because
often, decision makers approve of and benefit by it. The the54.
55.

Id. at 114.
See Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 2-4.
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ory that decision makers necessarily affirm rules on the notion
that rules must be followed is at best empirically unproven.
The Western judge is not permitted the luxury of open law
making. The myth must be maintained that judges interpret
and do not make law. It is thought that people cannot be told
about the truth behind the myth. If this truth got out, that the
legal and social order are up for grabs, stability of current social class arrangements might be jeopardized.
The concept that alleged continuity, preexisting rights mythology, judicial power and legitimacy are all linked scarcely
needs comment, or so one would have thought. On the other
hand, there is the vehemence of the denial which Professor
Dugard acutely points out of actors in the judicial arena. 56
There is the Positivist form of virtually every legal opinion, and
the indoctrinated ideology in the United States. There is the
attitude of the Bar and its spokespersons, the tongue-in-cheek
quality of which liberals partake as much as conservatives; the
virtual loyalty oath that a potential United States Supreme
Court justice must make that he/she would not engage injudi57
cial lawmaking even if forced at gunpoint.
Positivism then has a political content. At the same time,
Positivism could be used to ensure the continuation of an essentially just system, or as in South Africa, the existence of an
unjust one. Natural law could yield rights for a revolution, or
could ensure the gains of a well-founded system, or could be
the basis of unjustified privilege. 58 However, Unger argues
that privilege inherently gets built into social arrangements. 5 9
Positivism, or any other necessitarian jurisprudence, could be
the enemy of "empowered democracy."
B.

Competing Views Obscure Transformative Social Theory
1.

Legal Realism

There are Western jurisprudential views which compete with
Positivism, but such views may also obscure social theory.
Legal Realism is one such competing view. A basic idea of
56. See Dugard, supra note 23, at 383-86.
57. See, e.g., the Senate confirmation hearing ofJustice Kennedy in which he was
led through a series of questions to deny that he would engage in "result oriented"
decision making.

58. See Kaye, supra note 20, at 311.
59. See FALSE NECESSMr, supra note 1, at 33, 225, 265-66.
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Legal Realism is that law is determinate and rules are given as
an excuse to cover up a decision made on moral or social
grounds. Thus, Legal Realism, like Positivism, does not address social theory in any direct manner. Rather than advance
new views of social theory, Legal Realists have been more concerned with indicating that the legal system does not work as
Positivists say it does.
To the extent that Realists had a program, it was generally
social-science oriented. 60 Unger criticizes such an approach in
his attack on Positivist social science, accusing that approach of
taking for granted the social framework within which its findings are made. 61 If Legal Realists (with the exception of Professor Myres McDougal) 62 had a transformative program, it did
not clearly emerge. Generally, then, Legal Realists made no
sustained effort to develop a transformative program, but instead critiqued Positivism.
2.

Natural Law and Policy Science

Two jurisprudential theories which arguably have a transformative social program are Natural Law and Professor McDougal's Policy Science. However, there are significant
criticisms which can be made against either approach.
Natural Lawyers, for instance, may support necessitarian arguments. If one assumes, as Natural Lawyers often do, that
there are certain practices which are natural, or which reflect
unchangeable social arrangements (e.g., slavery), constructive
change may be hampered. 63 My students sometimes express
these naturalistic beliefs. For example, they argue that there is
natural inequality because some persons have more skills than
others. They advise me: elites therefore will always emerge, so
there is no use trying to do anything about it through law or
politics. Other students advise me that social Darwinism is
properly at work: those who fall by the wayside deserve their
fate. Such necessitarian arguments may inhibit appropriate
transformative potential. Natural lawyers also often have conflicting programs, and it may be difficult to pick and choose
60.
61.
62.
63.
ments

See Van Zandt, The New Legal Realism, 33 YALE L. REP. 2, 3 (1987).
See infra notes 174-186 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
See REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 169-222 (referring to these arguas structural naturalism; reference to slavery is at p. 173).
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between conflicting moral tenets. Natural Law, or moral argument, did not settle the Hart-Devlin debate over the criminal64
ity of homosexuality and prostitution.
Sociological or Policy Science jurisprudents who identify law
with social, political or economic interests also suffer from the
problem that there is no theory that links appropriate interests
together, or that indicates which interests should be preferred
over others. The McDougal inspired Yale School of Policy Science, a kind of sociological jurisprudence, is linked to a social
theory of democratic values. However, it seems to hover between having a democratic program, and emphasizing a
method for goal clarification. Policy Science has not been
widely accepted. The primary reason for non-acceptance of
the policy approach is that it too closely identifies law and politics which, from the view of the ruling elite, lets the cat out of
the bag and incorporates undesired controversy. In Unger's
terms, such an approach too clearly reveals that the judicial
than closed
arena is one of open ideological conflict, rather
65
decisionmaking.
rule-bound
predetermined
When Policy Science theorists identify important interests
such as wealth and dignity, this represents an advance. 66 In a
recent valiant attempt, Professor Luther McDougal used a policy approach in his property casebook. 67 While it was an important advance over Positivism, it led, as inevitably it must, to
a series of policy judgments by the author. While I might
agree with those judgments, they did not come from any enumerated social theory or system of values that was cogent or of
sufficient determinacy 68 to provide more than window dressing
for the prejudgment of the author (and largely myself).
For example, the idea of the widest possible sharing of
64. See REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 336-46. H.L.A. Hart believed that
the law should not affect all forms of social behavior, and that, specifically, the law
ought not cover consensual and private homosexual acts. Id. at 336-37. Lord Devlin,
in defense of such laws, argued that morals are appropriately regulated by the law.
Id. at 338-46.
65. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 271.
66. See REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 19 (identifying eight "outcomes"
desired by persons: power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection, respect
and rectitude).
67. See L. McDoUGAL & M. McDOUGAL, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION,
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 1981).
68. The eight categories, enumerated in note 66, supra, also do not lead to determinative results. They conflict and are subject to manipulation because of their high
level of generality.
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is
wealth consistent with the deployment of individual effort 69
one standard used by the New Haven Policy Science view.
But the conservative Law and Economics advocates might
agree with that, at least if the market, as constituted, is the
measure. That is the problem. What social arrangements lead
to the widest possible sharing of, for example, wealth? Attempts to decide cases based on these vague criteria are
fraught with the difficulties of indeterminacies of conflicting
values, without a megarule to resolve them.
C.

Competing Views: HistoricalJurisprudence

Historical jurisprudents may stress the static quality of aspects of human nature. If they have a social theory, it would be
a "natural" one: a necessitarian approach that basic elements
of human nature are unchangeable and cannot and should not
be changed by law superimposed on custom. 7 0 Thus, adher-

ents of historicism may reinforce necessity arguments: the alleged presence of constraints that prevent change through law
or otherwise. 7 ' Accordingly, historical jurisprudence is often a
source of negation of a transformative social theory.
D.

Unger's Approach to Politics and TraditionalJurisprudence

In using one sentence in Politics to get rid of Legal Positivism, Unger underestimates the hold that it has. 7 2 He has more

to say about other closure attempts. In Politics, Unger has
again taken issue with the rights and principles analysis of Professor Ronald Dworkin. Producing a phenomenon incredible
in itself, Dworkin and Unger had, until recently, gone their
merry ways, ignoring each other. Finally, however, the issue
between Dworkin and Unger is being joined.
Dworkin maintains that there is deducible from law in the
West a defensible form of human association. 73 Unger rejects
69. See L. McDoUGAL & M. McDOUGAL, supra note 67, at 3 (stating the basic goal
of democratic society is "the greatest possible production and the widest possible
sharing of all values without differentiation other than on the basis of individual capabilities or contribution to society ....").
70.

See REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 224-32.

71. Id.
72. See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 147 (stating that "[jlust about everyone
has agreed that you cannot adequately understand the law as a system of rules that
provides determinate solutions to particular problems of choice").
73. See Collins, supra note 26, at 396-98.
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this allegedly defensible form, describing it instead as a series
of compromises which cement, for a time, the place where the
fighting stopped.7 4 Thus, in Unger's view, such a scheme does
not represent a defensible form of human association. Unger
states: "But the one thing we should not do is to pretend that
the materials of the law add up to an intelligible and defensible
order." 75 Unger argues that law represents "a confused and
contradictory mass."- 76 He argues that law is too much of a
hodgepodge, a series of results in particular cases which lack
an organizing element. 77 Since a clear pattern of decision
making never emerges from the rules and principles applied, a
defensible scheme of human association is not deducible. The
more law is viewed as legislative will, the more it lacks a defensible character, 78 presumably because of the zig-zag, crazy quilt
pattern of legislation.
In the Unger-CLS version of the liberal model, there are
separate sets of presuppositions for three separate arenas:
public, private and business. 79 The private arena includes the
family, and has presuppositions of trust. The arms length/
stranger quality of business relations plays little part. In the
public constitutional arena, principles of democratic process
and accountability prevail. The business and commercial
arena, or market, is characterized by the absence of democratic
accountability. In other words, the Board of Directors and
President of IBM are not popularly elected. Those who own
or control property-what Unger calls the consolidated property right8°-control investment decisions without democratic
8
constraint. '
How can disputes within the state, family and market be resolved by a government of laws and not men? Unger (and
CLS) point out that the doctrinal area is not a fruitful source of
resolution because it is indeterminate. One must then move to
the policy level where conflicts present more indeterminacy.
74. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 265. SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at

148.
75.

SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 148.

76. Id.

77. Id.
78. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 302.

79. See Collins, supra note 26, at 398-399.
80. See, e.g., FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 70, 196.
81. Id. at 370.
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One then moves to what Dworkin calls background rights, or a
concept of the defensible form of human association posited
by liberalism. 82 This level allegedly resolves the conflict, with
the separation into the three spheres of state, family and
market. 83
But Unger points out that this demarcation is inherently unstable.8 4 Arguments from one arena can be used in another.
Enforceability of pre-nuptial contract is indeterminant in the
divorce or dissolution context because of the tension between
state imposed duties (i.e., child support, alimony and property
division) and consensual liability. In another context, free
speech may be brought from the political arena to protect
"whistle blowers" in industry. 85 Similarly, anti-discrimination,
or equality of opportunity provisions from the public constitutional arena are carried over into the business or market arena.
In sum, then, the unstable nature of these arenas leaves the
liberal concept of human association unclear.
This brief survey has indicated that traditional western jurisprudential approaches have avoided explicit revelation of underlying social theory. Either the social theory has been
implicit, or else, as is more usually the case, the Western approaches have served to obscure major questions: are the basic
social and personal arrangements, fostered by law and the
framework it reflects, appropriate? Are these arrangements
transformable, and if so, to what vision?
It might be objected that it never was the purpose of jurisprudential study to deal with social theory (we must not fault a
glove for not being a hat). Law then could be considered as
another positive social science which accepts rather than questions framework. But to the extent that this is true, it shows
the obsolescence, the irrelevance, or the political bias of traditional Western jurisprudence. 86 Moreover, it is not as though
jurisprudence were some description of a phenomenon (law)
which is politically neutral. It is charged with politics, and the
attempts to isolate law into some form of politically neutral
82. See Collins, supra note 26, at 396-97.
83. Id. at 398.
84. Id. 398-99.
85. Id. at 406.

86. See Kaye, supra note 20, at 303 (disputants "talk past each other" and avoid
sociological and other awkward inquiries).
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Positivism do themselves have political purposes.8 7
In sum, then, traditional Western jurisprudence has indicated a false closure, and subordinated the question of how law
gets to be the way it is. Such jurisprudence has often coupled
these stances with a false necessitarian imperative.8 8 For example, the claim is made that there are cases out there which
"must" be followed, or that Natural Law, social policy, or background rights dictate or provide one right answer for legal disputes (which, in fact, they do not).
In this context, Professor Unger's focus on social theory becomes most relevant. In Politics, Professor Unger addresses the
basic stories which rationalize the current state of Western society. Unger presumes, quite properly, that most traditional
jurisprudence has nothing to offer except foot dragging and
false idols. He views such jurisprudence as examples of necessitarian imperatives used to defend a status quo. Unger expands the conceptual arena to include a theory of historical
development, a theory of knowledge, human nature, and a
transformation of institutions to maximize human potential. 89
Unger wishes to establish a position for plasticity, that is, social and economic arrangements that are open for continued,
though not necessarily constant, restructuring. 90 He concludes that there is substantial room to maneuver toward a societal model in which social roles and hierarchies could
become blurred or indistinct, and yet still be capable of attaining goals of productivity and military might. His basic theme is
that familiar psychological, organizational and economic constraints, 9 ' of which the Western adjudicative rationalizations
which allege closure are an example, in reality are techniques
used to protect a privileged order.9 2
In the course of establishing his theme, Unger attacks the
notion that the particular institutions we have in 20th century
United States are necessary for maximum productive capabil87. See id. at 312-16.
88. See id. (as currently envisioned, both natural law and positivism reinforce the
status quo).
89. See generally PLASTICITY, supra note 1, at 208-12; FALSE NECESSITY, supra note
1, at 480-91.
90. See PLASTICITY, supra note 1, at 208-12; FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 484;
SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 22-23, 172-73 (reality of constraint affirmed).
91. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 277.
92. See id. at 33, 70-71 (control exercised through property rights produces constraining force on change).
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ity. Such "functionalist" claims as these he dismisses as
fables. 93 Alternative arrangements have existed and do exist
other places. 94 The historical path to present arrangements
appears to be a one way street only in retrospect, for it could
have been otherwise. 95 We may, to a degree, freely remake
96
our environment once we get over the idea that we cannot.
It is this idea that is Unger's major contribution: since we have
ourselves created the world view or constructs that represent
the framework, (as, for example family, market and state) we
97
can remake it.
In making this point that we construct our own social reality,
Unger alludes to the idea that "everything is politics." From
this springs the further idea that there is a struggle for power
over the ruling mechanism in a society which is unproblematic.
He then states that since we invent politics, and since we invent
the institutions and attitudes that produce our concept of a
political order, we can remake that order by recombining factors to produce other arrangements that are better. 98 Implicit

in Unger is the idea that the particular set of arrangements
known as liberalism is, in reality, a construct made or defended
because it serves the interest of those at the top to the detriment of those at the bottom.
II.

BACKGROUND OF UNGER'S THEORIES

A.

Short Summary

The basic human problem is how to achieve self assertion in
a community (what other choice is there?) whereby the terms
upon which one is available to others do not cause undue submission, subjection, dependence and loss. 99 In the realm of
individual relationships, there is the problem that persons will
betray our trust. In the arena of work, those who control can
require us to be in the undignified position of undue subjec93. See, e.g., id. at 212-13 (market system which in fact prevailed in West not
necessarily desirable).
94. See, e.g., id. at 223-28.
95. See id. at 332-37.
96. See id. at 37-40.
97. See Symposium, Roberto Unger's Politics: A Work in Constructive Social Theory
589-951, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 589-951 (1987) (passim).
98. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 44.
99. See id. at 351-52.
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tion. 00 The justification for subjection in the workplace is
usually based on necessitarian arguments which stress psychological, organizational and economic constraints. Routine activities, often involving undue subjection, exist in a framework
which is substantially implicit. New associates or law students
working in law firms will, I think, be able to think of examples
from their own relations with faculty or partners. In any event,
our problem is that we do not often question the framework
within which these routine activities take place.' 0 '
Unger defines "negative capability" as meaning the opportunity to make changes of framework in a system.' 0 2 Negative
capability is the extent to which a framework is malleable in the
direction of empowerment of individuals, or, put another way,
one in which it is possible to lessen the rigidity of power of
some over others.' 0 3 More possible in some systems than in
others, 10 4 these efforts in the direction of individual empowerment (or "small rebellions") have the potential to snowball.
This negative capability should be used. Lawyers, through a
process referred to as "deviationalist," for example, may use
the countertendencies in the legal system (e.g., unconscionability doctrine in contracts) to encourage a counter vision.' 0 5

To loosen the effect of perceived constraints, Unger argues
that change is not necessarily caused by a short list of laws or
processes. The only law concerning the results of change is
that there is no law controlling what results from change.
Change may occur in response to an environment, argues Unger, as an unwilled and unintended consequence of other apparently willed acts. '0 6 As an example, consider the creation of
the executory interest in English law following enactment of
the Statute of Uses. That the executory interest would be used
to create an indestructible interest was not foreseen.
In any event, the one point that Unger insists on again and
again is that there is no one cause of change, and no short list
of causes.10 7 There is also no assurance that the changes made
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 69, 263-64.
See id. at 61.
See id. at 36-37; 164-170.
See, e.g., id. at 36-37 (aimed at subjugation, depersonalization).
Id. at 36-37.
See Collins, supra note 26, at 402-07.
See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 188-99.
See generally id. at 200-15.
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will cause the society that adopts them to win out in the race
for productivity and military might.10 8 Nothing is inevitable in
societal development. The products of societal movement are
underdetermined in part because there is a lack of identifiable
causes that produce them.' 0 9
Adopting the goals of liberty, equality and fraternity, Unger
argues that it is he who is really following the liberal tradition.
He sees himself as the real liberal who wishes to push the goals
of liberalism, socialism and communism beyond the place
where they are stuck."l 0 In his view, the classical liberal conception results in betrayal of the liberal course. There are no
significant democratic controls of the economic sphere in
which we spend our working lives. The result is a rigid hierarchy which separates task definition from task execution."' If
this seems abstract, think about who tells whom to do what in
society. Consideration of this relationship should, as I mentioned earlier, make the concept immediately clear to law students and associates in law firms, since these persons are often
in the role of receiving the task definition and performing the
task. In the market context, this power relationship may be
degrading to the ideals of community and fraternity. Social
roles are rigidified, and the terms upon which persons are
available to each other are distorted." 2 Vanguard industry
and military operations have broken down this distinction between ordering and obeying to achieve the aims of liberalism, I l but these are isolated phenomena.
In elaborating his views, Unger addresses four basic
problems. First, how do social arrangements get to be the way
they are, or, in other words, what social theory best explains
social arrangements. Second, what theory of knowledge complements or is necessary to support his social theory. Third,
what values should be promoted in existing and 4future institutional arrangements and human interactions.'
Fourth, by
what means can the goals be obtained. In addressing knowl108.
ity and
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id. at 213 (nothing guarantees we will properly combine practical capabilimproved human relations).
See id. at 105-09, 200-15.
See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 10, 20-23.
Id. at 75-76.
See id. at 75-79, 263-64.
See id. at 154-58.
See infra, notes 187-249 and accompanying text.
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edge problems, Unger considers the fact-value dichotomy, that
is, the problem of what truth claims can be made to support
the values or normative commitments he adopts."l 5 In developing an affirmative program, Unger breaks ranks with the
Critical Legal Studies movement. Most CLS advocates have
largely confined themselves, as had Unger, to criticism of existing liberalism in the Western world, and the United States in
particular.
B.
1.

Unger's Theory

The Knowledge Problem

For Unger, the knowledge problem is fundamental. As mentioned in Part I of this article, Unger and CLS have successfully
attacked the underpinnings of Western legalism by undermining the claims of closure through objective knowledge. In developing his own position, Unger asserts that the only
"objective" knowledge is that there is no invariable element in
what we understand. Thus, our tentative truths must be subject to constant revision.
In developing his position on knowledge, Unger produces a
series of provocative comparisons to what are thought of as
hard sciences. He makes the important point that the search
for an invariable element in our knowledge is illusive. l6 With
reference to the disciplines of mathematics, cosmology (here,
the origin of the universe), geometry, mineralogy, evolution
and others, he shows that any "invariable" element of knowledge is relative to the organizing scheme developed to understand a particular science. ' 17 The assertions within these
disciplines hold only until the next or an opposing scheme is
imagined. Because we cannot say that further insights will not
be made, it is impossible to contain within one description the
possible extent of insight and understanding.
To give one illustration, Unger traces the fall of the Euclidean approach in natural science. That approach gave rise to
the idea that there were self-evident truths, e.g., of space and
time." 8 But ideas of space and time have obviously since been
revised (for example in the work of Einstein) as have many of
115.
116.
117.
118.

See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 366-68.
See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 172-99.
Id.
See id. at 80-81, 84, 177-80.
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the other natural science propositions once deemed self evident." 19 In this manner then, Unger rejects a basic premise of
positive social science that there can be found once and for all
an invariable, unchangeable or objective element in our understanding. 20 Such an approach to knowledge also undermines
a Marxist deep logic approach that through human agents or
otherwise, perceived causal relationships make for an invariable pattern. '21

Unger does not wish to argue that all phenomenon are contingent on the particularities of the circumstance of occurrence. There are constraints in Unger's world, for example,
constraints of matter. 2 2 The problem he finds is that those
constraints are blown out of proportion to develop assumed
psychological, organizational and economic constraints and
other naturalistic theory that retard change. 23
Rather than abandon objectivity and fall prey to the seduction of nihilism, Unger defines what can be salvaged as objective, namely, the notion of constant revisability itself. 124 This
involves the negation of naturalistic approaches which impose
organizational, psychological and economic constraints.
These are and were used to create an objective model of hierarchy, deviation from which was said to be inappropriate.
2.

Unger's Social Theory

Unger warms up for his attack on naturalistic approaches by
considering two major targets: first, deep logic, or deep structure Marxism, and second, Positivist social science. 125 The
Marxist theory he wishes to decimate is one which sees historical development as inexorable or subject to law-like
constraints. 126
119. Id.
120. See

SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 176; see generally id. at 80-87, 172-99.
121. See id. at 96-120, 176 (discussion of Marx's "evolutionary deep-structure social theory").
122. See id. at 193-94.
123. See id. at 172-99.
124. See id. at 85-87.
125. See, e.g., id. at 176.
126. Id.; See also FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 14-19.
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a. Attack on Marxist Theory-Inexorable Progressionand
Functionalism
Unger's basic point is that the individual can make a difference in producing social change. Unger therefore opposes
Marxist theorists who may claim that there is a flow of history
in determinate stages, e.g., from feudalism to capitalism to socialism to communism. 2 7 If, as some Marxists suppose, these
movements obey law-like constraints, individuals may play a
relatively minor role in social change. Much of Unger's exposition is spent attacking the idea that historical development is
subject to such constraints. This opposition brings out a key
feature of Unger's approach: change does not occur as a product of law-like constraints, and persons do, and should, make a
difference in determining the kind of society we have. Indeed,
because of naturalistic and necessitarian beliefs and dogma,
Unger believes that persons are subject to a false necessity syndrome. Constraints may result from the belief that there is
some natural, unstoppable progression of history.128
Unger is unconvinced by explanations which rely on law as
an explanation for historical change. He examines the Marxist
thesis that a certain framework (i.e., the relations of production) produces an elite class that dictates law and institutions as
a means of effectuating control.' 2 9 The Marxist thesis continues: there is no change until a new mode of production (e.g.,
industrial vs. cottage industry) produces a new group which
then alters law and ideology to conform to its interest. 130 Together with this analysis goes a functionalism that Unger also
opposes. The functional argument is that the elite can be successful because the institutions they produce do in fact work
well for them, or are inexorable in terms of fulfilling the terms
of their domination and are therefore universally applicable to
produce such results.' 3 ' To put it colloquially, functionalists
oppose change in law and society by saying that there is only
one way to run a railroad, no matter where it is. Unger argues
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
93-96.

See, e.g., Collins, supra note 26, at 390.
See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 87-120 (supporting this paragraph).
See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 287-88.
See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 93-96.
See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 332-40; SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at
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that there are plenty of ways to run a railroad: look around
you.
Unger thus maintains that there is no one set of institutions
and societal arrangements that lead to maximum productivity
and military might. First, the legal arena contains contradiction, so there is no clear pattern. 32 For example, the business
community on the one hand needs "equity," such as trust and
good faith, and on the other hand needs "law," which provides
the arms length rigidity of rules with no deviation. Second,
when one's vision is expanded, history reveals several paths
that societies have taken to attain different modes of production. 1 33 Here the contrast between the West and Japan could
be made. Third, where capitalism is the subject, it becomes
impossible to define capitalism and market economy in such
ways as are consistent with the thesis of one, and only one, big
cause, such as a dominant elite acting to secure power. 13 4 The
whole notion of cause needs to be relaxed.
As Unger perceives it, Marxists must face the criticism that
there are no law-like constraints. Some Marxist apologists
have retrenched, e.g., to "relative autonomy."' 135 Relative autonomists argue that the causal relations between the dominant class and particular societal arrangements are loose.
There is a degree to which those social arrangements or institutions are autonomous, that is, have a life of their own, and
are not affected by pressure from the dominant elites.' 3 6 Perhaps the minimum wage, or equal pay for women are examples
that may not be in the interest of the dominant elite. And the
movement goes two ways: institutional arrangements and laws,
which on the one hand may operate to promote elite interests,
come back to impact the dominant group (and for that matter,
many other groups). For instance, many groups may be bound
to participate in desegregation or conjoined to obey laws
against discrimination on the basis of race or sex.
The problem for Marxist apologists is that, having now taken
one step away from the one cause thesis (i.e., the dominant
elite necessarily getting its way), they must now rely on several
132. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 101.
133. See id. at 223-28.
134. See id. at 196-98; SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 101-13, 176.
135. See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 113-17, 176. "Relative Autonomy" is a
convenient shorthand term for Unger's concept here.
136. Id.
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causes. Unger explores the danger that the more the one
cause thesis is relaxed, the more it includes too much-too
many historical situations which could qualify as capitalist (and
not enough). 37 Qualifications emerge which create so many
exceptions that the historian is put in the position of a judge
trying to apply a rule riddled with exceptions. The rule-like
character of the one cause thesis becomes undermined, and
the application of the relative autonomy theme is, to coin a
38
phrase, indeterminate. 1

b. Functionalism and Deep Structure
A second key concept in Unger's thought is that false necessity also develops from a functionalist approach. 139 The term
functionalism is used to indicate the power of certain acts to
produce specified effects.140 This functionalist approach may
derive from Marxism, or from liberal apologetic modes.' 4' In
Marxism, a basic notion is that our idea of social reality is constructed from the interest of a dominant class which controls
the means of production. 42 While Unger agrees that explanations of social reality are constructs or, as he puts it, artifacts,
he disagrees with the implications of this particular Marxist
43

construct. 1

For Marxists, the dominant class creates institutions and
laws which are designed to achieve, or are functionally related
to, certain goals. These goals are the perpetuation or reproduction of society in a form favorable to upper class domination. 144 Hence, any given set of institutions, government, law,
and so on, will bear a functional relation to that end. Such
institutions and laws will be the ones best designed (or at least
well designed) to keep the dominant class on top. 14 5 Unger
questions the idea that there is an inevitable thesis/antithesis
build-up of counter forces which would lead to the collapse of
137. Id. at 101-109, 113-17.
138. See Collins, supra note 26, at 391.
139.

See

FALSE

NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 332-37.

140. See id. at 332.
141. See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 99-100, 111, 160.
142. See id. (criticizing inference that there is a "one-to-one" relationship between
modes of production and levels of production).
143. Id. at 99-120.
144. See H. COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW 28-29 (1984) (legal and political institution created by dominant social class to preserve their class position).
145. See id.
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the ruling order in each previous stage of development.14 6
c. Attack on Functionalist Theory of Liberalism
As mentioned above, persons who do not accept Marxist
thought, and who perhaps are conservative in orientation, may
share the functionalist theory. Conservatives may believe that
the institutions and laws in capitalism are necessary for capitalist society.' 4 7 In other words, such functionalists believe that
the basic market structure in, e.g., the United States, is the basic
capitalist structure, and the basic market structure.148 Deviation from those institutional arrangements would strike at the
heart of capitalism and market and kill the goose that lays the
golden eggs. Put another way, a third-world country would
have to adopt all the same institutions that comprise the present version of capitalism and market in rich Atlantic countries,
or not take capitalism at all. 149 Capitalism could not, continues
the functionalist, be transplanted with a leaf here and a root
there. Take the tree or take nothing. Marxists also may see
capitalism as a system whose characteristics would have to be
transplanted in toto, and whose constituent parts form a whole
that cannot be transplanted piecemeal. 50
Unger asks, what is it that is distinctive about capitalism?
What is distinctive about the idea of the market economy?
"Capitalism" and "market" are indeterminant concepts with
no one inherent meaning.' 5' If market and capitalism are indeterminant, there can be no one meaning to transplant. Unger argues that other countries which developed capitalism,
e.g., Germany, did so later with a greater participation of central government. 52 He defies the social analyst to fit a functionalist explanation for historical occurrences into any
meaningful definition of capitalism and market. 53 Such con146. See SOCIAL

THEORY,

supra note 1, at 119.

147. See id. at 160; Collins, supra note 26, at 397 (Marxists and Posner would agree
that concepts such as private property and free market resolve controversy).
148. See, e.g., SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 109-13 (In a criticism of this theory,
Unger suggests there are many "capitalist" combinations of work organization which
have no Western counterparts).
149. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 83.
150. See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 101 (capitalism seen by Marxists as indivisible social type-to dilute that concept reduces law-like behavior argument).
151. See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 101-09, 160.
152. See id. at 107.
.153.

See supra, note 151.
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servative approaches make functional and deep structure arguments which hold that existing institutions relating to market
and capitalism are the most suited to society and its productive
functions.15 4 Unger argues that persons advocating this naturalistic approach are wrong to contend that a set of institutional arrangements which happen to occur in North America
in 1989 are necessarily the highest achievement that can be
produced, and are of necessity the only ones which are suitable
to the society.'

55

For example, Unger argues that there could have been an
alternative development of "petty commodity production" in
the formative stages of capitalism. 56 This was nipped in the
bud, explains Unger, because elites found the central feature
of differentiation between task defining and task execution
congenial to their own position. 57 The process of petty commodity production blurs the distinction between task execution and task definition.1 8

An example is the small scale

farmer, or artisans in the textile trade in France. 59 Task definition and task execution in this setting are often shared endeavors. Granted, says Unger, small scale cottage industry did
lose out. 160 But, he would have us note that the small farmer

continued to exist. First, this was because of subsidies and
other institutional arrangements designed to encourage that
endeavor.' 6 ' Such industry still exists today in France and
elsewhere.16 2 But it could not have existed without institutional/market arrangements suitable to its development.
Mass-scale industry, with the separation between task definition and task execution won out. 163 But such industry did so

by structuring the market in such a way as to promote that arrangement, and suppress the cottage industry development.64
154. See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 129, 160.

155. See id. at 111, 129 (synthesis of deep structure and functionalism-"only one
combination of institutions" can sustain productive capability).
156. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 223-28.
157. Id. at 227-28.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 185-87.
160. See, e.g., id. at 187-88.
161. See id. at 187-91.
162. See id. at 185-87.
163. See id. at 191, 195 (relative failure of petty commodity production due to hostile institutional structure).
164. See id. at 181-82, 227.
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It could have been otherwise; it was not inevitable. One could
infer that a reason to suppress the cottage industry was because the mass production controllers saw the breakdown of
the distinction between task definition and control as endangering their position in the social hierarchy.' 65 Put simply, the
small scale cottage industry model allows for more equality in
determining what is to be done, and who is to do it. If that
idea spread, creating a vast partnership between workers and
managers, the position of elites across the board might be
undermined.
C. Military History Analogies-HistoricalDevelopment Not Subject
to Law-Like Constraints
To further attack the Marxist deep logic and functional approaches, Ungerjuxtaposes historical examples of military encounters and the development of productive capability.' 66 He
sees them as opposite sides of the same coin. Unger would like
to show that military ventures and responses have been most
successful when the troops have been allowed to respond to
battlefield situations without being subject to command structures imposed from outside. 167 The ideal model, from his
standpoint, is the functioning of elite troops or commando operations. Improvisation is encouraged in each individual.
Task execution and task defining are performed by the troops
themselves on the spot. Unger observes that this military blurring of task-defining and task-executing could serve as a model
68
for altering other functions of society.'
Unger wishes to establish the position against a predetermined rigidity-the notion that "these institutions must be like
this"-and for plasticity of social institutions as the best road
to worldly power and productive capability.' 69 Unger concedes that it is uncertain whether plasticity, or placing a premium on openness to change institutions and arrangements,
will be the best road to take. 170 We cannot know, for instance,
whether a despotism will or will not win out in the process.' 71
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See id. at 227-28.
See, e.g., id. at 161-63.
See id. at 162.
See id. at 163.
See, e.g., id. at 32-33; PLASTICITY, supra note 1, at 208, 212.
See PLASTICITY, supra note 1, at 212.
Id.
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As he has already observed, the results of change are indeterminate. Unger then raises the question of what remains of his
theory after this important qualification. Since results are indeterminate, 172 Unger relies on his moral notions of what is
appropriate in society to lessen the power that an elite hold
73
over others.1
1. Attacks on "Positivist Social Science"
1 74
Unger also takes Positivist social science as a major target.
From Unger's perspective, the position of Positivist social
scientists contains several major flaws. For one, they take the
framework of society for granted as an unalterable component. 175 Framework is the often implicit structure under which
societal members operate. 176 An example of "framework" is
as follows. A person wants to be a creative writer. But she
cannot do so because of the fact she is not one of the very few
who can make a living at it. There may be other employments
which are available to her. The "market" demands up-to-date
information about how to value stocks, or advice on the legal
arena in which transactions take place. Thus, she may choose
to become a financial news reporter or a lawyer. Critical social
theory would attempt to imagine changed arrangements that
would allow such persons to fulfill their true ambitions for selffulfillment by creating a limited number of subsidies for
writers. 177
"Routine" is activity that follows from the structure of
framework. A routine is the day-to-day things that people do
in work or social contexts, e.g., who gets the coffee, who closes
the door, who waits till someone else terminates the meeting.
So a framework is often an unarticulated supposition about
who tells whom to do what, and who does the what that is implicitly or explicitly required. 178 Our framework often involves
a pecking order. Perhaps who goes to whose office if they want

172. Id. at 208-12.
173. See id. at 212.
174. See, e.g., FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 276-77; SOCIAL
1, at 1-2.

175. See

SOCIAL THEORY, supra note

THEORY,

supra note

1, at 2.

176. Id. at 2-3.
177. See Collins, supra note 26, at 388-89.
178. See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 3-5; 88-91 (the examples are mine).
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something is an example. I do not ordinarily summon the
Dean to my office if I want a leave of absence.
Positivist social scientists may assume that existing institutions and social arrangements are the ones best fitted for the
particular society. 179 For example, such social scientists may
fail to question whether the institutional structure which determines the mode of court or other dispute resolution, is appropriate. Secondly, they believe that the progression of society
obeys law-like constraints. 180 Unger refers, for example, to
conventional economists. If pressed, they will agree that the
"laws" they see operating in the area of unemployment or
price are, at best, particular to the framework of capitalism currently practiced in, say, the United States in 1989.181 But this
is only giving lip service to the potential effects of the transformation of framework. Their basic approach reflects a lack of
interest in changing basic societal institutions. So, for them it
is back to business-if we raise the interest rate ... ., or reduce
the capital gains tax ....
In summary, Unger attaches to Positivist social science the
following premises: 1) that the framework determines routine
through the constraint of a preordained natural way;' 8 2 and 2)
that social life is best explained as problem solving relating to
8 3
conflicts of interest groups or the pursuit of self-interest.
With respect to the first of these two premises, one particular
set of constraints relating to functionalism may arise.' 8 4 One
would be a Positivist social scientist if one believes that current
institutional settings and market structures are necessary for
maximum productivity and military might, and that capitalism
and market structure cannot be transplanted except as a
whole. 18 5 In such a view, institutions form a seamless web such
that to alter one will imperil the whole. 8 6 In short, the positive social scientist assumes that what we have is the best and it
cannot be changed. Ultimately, however, such assumptions
179. Id. at 9-10, 130, 131-32.
180. Id. at 146-47.
181. Id. at 133-35.
182. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 277.
183. See id. Collins, supra note 26, at 389.
184. See discussion of functionalism, supra text section II (B)(2).

185. See, e.g.,
186. Id.

FALSE NECESSITY,
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may only be legitimating positions which rationalize elite
control.
2.

Unger's Affirmative Program

As a prelude to his affirmative program, Unger sets up the
current dominant theory, namely, large scale mass production
necessitates rigid separation of task definition and task execution. 187 The contrasting vanguard style, where the troops are
little generals, occurs as an occasional anecdote in military operations and the economy.188 Unger attacks this dominant version which contends that there must be large scale mass
production and accompanying separation between task defini89
tion and execution. 1

Unger admits that certain structures in a society constrain
the development of possible frameworks. Historically, ruling
groups such as agrarian bureaucracies have explored a series
of limited political options, 190 suggesting restraints flowing
from framework. Unger pursues a modern parallel which he
calls reform cycles. 19 1 Reform cycles seem to be governmental
tinkering back and forth with marginal redistributive adjustments: perhaps changes in who gets what deductions in the
income tax code would be one good example. Major political
parties enact these marginal changes in one way or another
when they get into power. Unger argues that the reform cycles
become part of the routine. 192 Unger thus affirms that some
frameworks or contexts, such as those producing the limitations of the reform cycle problem, are quite inflexible.19 3
Moreover, Unger argues that certain other relationships
which permeate social organization constrain the development
of possible frameworks. For example, the patron-client relation is not conducive to relaxation of hierarchy. 194 In the patron-client relationship, presumably exemplified by feudalism,
the client gives services for protection. For the client, this is an
incomplete relationship. The donee-client becomes depen187. See id. at 176-77.

188. See id. 161-63.
189. See id. at 227-28.
190. See PLASTICITY, supra note 1, at 21-22.
191. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 44-79, 172-73.

192. See id. at 17, 52, 54-55, 172-73.
193. See id. at 60.
194. See id. at 164.
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dent and vulnerable by receiving patronage, but the patron
does not. Unger believes ingratiating relationships such as this
have been altered only when the social order is reimagined. 195
a. Historical Content: Property, Contract and Classical Liberalism
The property-contract regime is more conducive to relaxation of the distinction between task defining and task execution.' 96 Presumably the purpose of Unger's development of
the origin of the property-contract regime is to debunk a functionalist explanation that there necessarily inheres in property
and contract a particular content such as curtailment of state
power. Thus, for Unger, there is nothing necessary or unchangeable in the doctrines which would indicate they must be
preserved as they exist at any particular time. 97
Unger explains that originally in early modern Europe, the
development of the current property-contract regime developed from a deal between elites. 98 The ruling elite was not
different from the economic elite, except that the ruling elite
exercised governmental power. 199 The ruling elite obtained
greater control over finance and armies, in exchange for the
dispersal of economic rights associated with contract and property. Absolute ownership gave the economic elite the power to
determine the conditions under which non-owners would survive. The trade off was statist power to the ruling elite. Thus,
argues Unger, the origin of absolutist property and contract
was the expansion of statist power: the delegation to a political
central group of more ruling powers, rather than the curtailment of governmental power. 200
The compromised political structure which emerges is based
on two ideas. First, the fear of power and dependence produces a theory that we are governed by impersonal rules. We
have impersonal rules because we need to fear others, and the
discretion allowed by personalized rules would undermine the
195. See id. at 135-44, especially 143-44.
196. See id. at 164.
197. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 198-200; Hunt, The Critiqueof Law: What
is "Critical"About CriticalLegal Theory?, 14J. L. & Soc'Y 5, 14 (1987) (search for social

origins
198.
199.
200.

of theory is part of critique).
See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 198-200.
Id.
Id.
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supposed protection. 20 Concomitant is a governmental structure which results in stalemate coupled with protections of citi20 2
zens from governmental power.
Developments in the United States led to separation of
power in government based on a fear of power in the government, and a concentration of power in private hands. Unger
explores the political paradox that universal suffrage in the
United States has not led to a dismantling of systematic privilege, encouraged by the property right as constituted. 203 Why?
The "official" story is that the political process produces a series of compromises in which concentration of power is undermined because of the competition between various interest
groups. 20 4 Another reason why there has been no real attack
on the bastion of privilege in the "official" story is that persons
think they can break out of the class structure, and want the
20 5
benefits of class privilege there waiting.
Unger is clearer on the fact of the privileging that results
from the property-contract regime than the reasons the privilege persists. Surprisingly, Unger rejects the false consciousness explanation. He accepts it in the general context of
persons thinking what is here is natural and necessary, but rejects it in the context of an explanation as to why the mass vote
has not led to substantial reduction of privilege. 20 6 That result
has been stymied by acceptance of the consolidated property
right, and accompanying contract law which allow a small
group of private persons to control investment decisions, and
continue the pattern of differentiation between task execution
and task definition. 20 7 Unger considers the right consolidated
because all the rights of property are aggregated in one entity,
for example, the right to property exists indefinitely, is subject
to transfer, and may be inherited. 20 8 Instead of an appropriate
level of equality, we have the working force subjected to a routine which denies their equality. 20 9
201.

See SOCIAL THEORY supra note 1, at 27 (appeal of liberalism's defenders to

impersonal principles); REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 351.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 454-56, 526.
See id. at 213-16.
See id. at 217-21.
See id. at 214-15.
See id. at 216.
See id. at 21, 69-70, 196, 370, 481.
Id. at 500.
See, e.g., id. at 69.
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b. Revised CapitalAllocation
Unger's central program conceives that a breakup of the
consolidated property right will achieve the goals assumed by
classical liberalism. Unger claims also to assimilate the goals
of conservatives (including classical liberalism), socialists, and
communists, who favor decentralization, liberty, equality and
fraternity.210 Some want more community, others more equality, and liberty. Unger thus attempts to make good on his
claim that he is the true liberal. Others make the mistake of
associating particular institutions extant today with necessary
components of capitalism and market. 21 ' Unger also favors
capitalism and market, as he defines them, or rather, as he
places content in them.
Unger thus rejects the socialist alternative of state ownership
of the means of production. State ownership simply transfers
the "consolidated property right" from a few private hands to
a few "public" hands. 21 2 In Unger's revision of the current
system, democratic controls would be extended to the group
of government officials who would make capital available on a
temporary basis to teams of entrepreneurs and workers.2 13
There would be a two-tier control of capital. The first tier is
composed of government officials drawn from the central executive and representative bodies.2 14 The second tier administers capital under guidelines from the first tier of officials.215

Broad outlines of policy are set which help blur the distinction
between social roles, hierarchies and divisions, and task executing and defining functions.2 16 In doing so, the standards
set help eliminate the problem of an entrenched skilled and
semi-skilled unionized labor force that has no concern for a
floating pool of laborers who are "unskilled." 217
The businesses operating in this arrangement are allowed
incentive in that they get increased income for their efforts. 2' 8
210.
HARV.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See id. at 10, 348; see generally Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
L. REV. 561 (1983).
See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1,at 196-97.
See id. at 481-82.
See id. at 491-93.
See id. at 493.
See id.
See id. at 498-99, 508.
See id. at 499-500.
See id. at 492 (enterprises profit from their activity).
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However, overall limits are set by the first tier representative
body. 2 19 Within the sphere of capital takers, there is a group
where there are no holds barred, or as Unger puts it, they are
like gamblers. 22 0 The qualifications and exceptions to the
arms length, survival of the fittest ethic in contracts and property (e.g., fiduciary duty or unconscionability doctrine) are
eliminated with a vengeance. 2 2' Within that sphere the consolidated property right reappears, except that profit is limited
2 22
and capital may be withdrawn
The second tier of this rotating capital fund is a group partly
appointed and partly elected. 2 23 These second tier administrators have as a model a bank or philanthropic "Ford Foundation." 2 24 This group allocates capital to a team of
entrepreneurs, technicians and workers. 22 5 The capital may go
22 6
to large or small groups with a high priority on innovation.
It bears repeating that capital could be concentrated, but the
22 7
claims to it are not absolute in time, and may be withdrawn.
Inheritance is eliminated because security is provided through
a system of entitlements, discussed hereafter as immunity
rights. 22 8 Elimination of inheritance prevents the control of
the industrial and commercial arena from being kept in the
same families generation after generation. 22 9 The state would
be financed by a charge on capital made in the first instance to
the controllers of capital, and passed on to the teams of persons who would engage in industry, commerce and farming. 230
c.

Normative Priorities

In Unger's program, it would be state policy to reduce inequalities. 23 ' Though Unger does not suggest it, I would offer
the idea that the elimination of inheritance could be a useful
219. See id. at 493 ("wage and authority disparities" and "rights to distribute gains
as current income").

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 522.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 522-23.
See id. at 494-95.
Id. at 495.
See id. at 491.
Id. at 498-99; Unger, supra note 210, at 596.

227.

See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 496.

228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 500-01.
See id.
Id. at 491-92.
See id. at 493, 500.
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transition step in bringing about the revised order. Thus, control over capital could be assumed by the state gradually without confiscation and direct redistribution that could prove
troublesome in implementation. Presumably also, inheritance
could be eliminated without legal problems under the current
constitutional dispensation. Confiscation might be viewed as a
"taking."
The underlying assumptions of Unger's institutional reordering are: 1) that no institutional arrangements are sacred; 232
2) that there is a tendency to freeze power relationships into
those who control and those who are controlled; 2 3 3) that this
diminishes some people and unnecessarily privileges others; 234
4) that the government must be able to break the limitations of
the reform cycle, and engage in real reform which is inhibited
by outdated ideas of government stalemate through checks
and balances; 235 and 5) that governmental policy, including
economic policy, should be periodically put to public approval
or disapproval.236
What Unger wishes to accomplish, through what he calls the
spirit of the new constitution, has an ephemeral quality. Persons may experience a kind of redemption, presumably a secu-

lar one. 23 7 It is not that everyone will be put in a situation of

redistributive equality in one fell swoop. Rather, institutional
arrangements which impede this tendency will be under attack.
There will be role jumbling, and role confusion. 238 Roles, a
function of frozen reality and hierarchy, will be under attack,
23 9
and reduced.
d. Rights
There are three basic sets of rights in Unger's affirmative
program: 1) immunity rights, 2) destabilizing rights, and 3) solidarity rights (discussion of this last right appears in the
footnote) 240
232. Id. at 397-401.
233. See id. at 505 (the politics of privilege tend to reappear).
234. Id. at 397-401.
235. See id. at 454-57.
236. Id. at 457.
237. See generally id. at 570-96.
238. Id. at 593-94.
239. See id. at 499, 593-94.
240. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 524-30, 530-35, 535-39. Solidarity
rights are group rights based on community oriented subdominant rights in existing
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Immunity rights include protections from violence, coercion
and poverty. 24 1 Immunity rights put the citizen in a position
that he/she is not cowed by authority or threatened by the revisable nature of the political life, and that he/she can participate in civic life. 2 42 Perhaps this might be viewed as expanding
the theory of academic tenure to the society at large. Another
purpose of this economic aspect of the immunity right is to
prevent a worker from developing too much of a vested inter2 43
est in a particular job so as to provide a flexible work force.
Destabilizing rights are the rights in groups, perhaps a specialized governmental body, whose work it is to prevent deals,
accommodations and arrangements which cement in or freeze
particular hierarchies. 24 4 Unger indicates that his system will
generate cliques, and deals between the government authorities who control capital and the capital takers. 2 45 The remedy
here comes from the theory that no institutional arrangement
is sacred. From the bottom, there will be neighborhood organizations of restless inquiring citizens. 2 46 They are freed from
fear of governmental retaliation by immunity rights (note here
again the possible parallel to tenured faculty members), and
have time for this activity. 24 7 Nothing is sacred, except that
nothing is sacred. There are far reaching constitutional
property and contract law. These rights stress confidence and trust, and not taking
unfair advantage. They relate to persons who have ongoing relationships in business
for whom arms-length business arrangements are deemed inappropriate. These
rights are not enforceable through legal procedures, but they remain as important
ideals. These rights are neither legal rights nor natural law rights, according to Unger. Presumably they serve to bridge the gap between the two sets of standards-a
stronger, arms-length willed transaction set of standards for contract, and the protected, trusting private sphere, where one takes refuge from the brutal world of business and work.
Unger rejects the notion that there is a problem with rights as such. Those who
see rights as necessarily alienating, make an error. The mistake here is to associate
rights with a vested interest in a particular kind of capitalist structure, one with, for
example, a consolidated property right. That right puts all the powers connected
with property in one person or entity. Rights may be alienating as administered, but
they need not be if hierarchy is reduced and the terms of availability of humans to
each other is altered in the working sphere. See id. at 508-10.
241. Id. at 524-30.
242. Id. at 524-25.
243. See id. at 499-500, 528-29 (the degree of support is such that one may withdraw from work life).
244. Id. at 530-35.
245. Id. at 533-34 (bias may develop in capital allocation).
246. Id. at 579-80.
247. See id. at 524-30.
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changes.248 Changes occur which allow for the effective use of
state power. Basically, there is an executive decisional core
with power to effect reform, and serious disputes may be handled by referring the matter to the electorate. 249 Unger here
seems to have in mind the British "Westminster System," with
a strong emphasis on referendum.
III.

UNGER'S AFFIRMATIVE PROGRAM: EVALUATION

Summary of Evaluation

A.

I am a sympathetic critic with three evaluative observations
which I consider relatively minor. My concerns relate to: 1)
knowledge problems, 2) problems of piecemeal participation,
including the problem of piecemeal rebellion against framework by positive social scientists or others, and 3) related to
.the knowledge problem, the normative aspect of the controversy over the preferred model of human association.
B.

Knowledge Problems

Unger exploited the knowledge problem in his attack on existing liberalism. 250 Unger has unleashed the same "dragon"
as the Legal Realists unleashed. The dragon here is that if
there is no closure, and no objective truth, how can any set of
normative commitments inside or outside the judicial process
be defended? 251 As put by one commentator, "a central focus
of Unger's attack upon the rule of law-and liberal society-is
his presumption that legal doctrine (or, indeed, any knowl252
edge) is incapable of being wholly neutral or objective."
253
What is Unger's knowledge base? Are we not at impasse?
Unger's first reply could be that the problem with liberalism
is that it rests on a naturalistic, necessitarian edifice. It is classical liberals, and orthodox Marxists who purport to have found
a closure or finality in terms of historical processes or theories
248. Id. at 454-55 (under the present constitutional system of checks and balances, stalemates of power occur whenever real reform is likely).
249. Id. at 456-61. (The president is to be popularly elected.).
250. See, e.g., R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
251. See Hunt, supra note 197, at 7-8 (identifying the dispute within CLS as to
whether affirmative theory is possible in view of the death of the Enlightenment faith
in objective truth).
252. See Alford, supra note 6, at 965 (arguing that Unger shows himself to be culture bound in his conceptions).
253. See Van Doren, Impasse: Is There a Beyond?, 13 W. ST. U.L. REV. 493 (1986).
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of the judicial process, or more generally in current political
and economic institutions. The strength of my theory, Unger
might say, is that it rests on a denial of a fixed context or
254
framework of knowledge and action.
Unger wants us to make use of this context smashing knowledge to remake institutions so that they prevent a hardening of
the arteries into some scheme in which necessitarian claims
foreclose change. Unger can properly claim that he is not making any objective closure-type presumptions. His whole approach is that institutions must be continually subject to
revision, because there can be no final solution. 255
However, another problem remains. What is the epistemological and normative basis of Unger's commitment to liberty,
equality and fraternity? What of the preference for context
smashing, for breakdown of the power that a few have over
many in the economic arena? What of the attempts to break
up social stratification and roles, and what of attempts to jumble roles and render persons more accessible to each other?256
Where is the normative basis for making changes which would
allow us (or more of us) to be able to engage in self-assertion
in a community without excessive dependence, loss of self and
dignity? 257
Unger states that there should neither be total rebellion
against all that is, which he calls modernism, 258 or total acceptance of what there is. The middle course, one which imagines
the imagination, will produce results which are tentative and
controversial. 259 Unger inevitably faces the knowledge question, which involves the normative question, or, as he puts it,
antinomy between fact and value:2 60 which is, how do we
know? So the problem of knowledge comes back to haunt Unger. His answer is as it must be, since God has not spoken yet,
that he has no answer to the knowledge skeptic. 261 He speaks,
254. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 12 (no context is a permanent home).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 354-55 (anticipating this argument).
257. See Smolin, Roberto Unger's Theory of Personality, Law, and Society: Critique and
Proposalfor a Revised Methodology, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 423, 433-39 (1986) (suggesting
that Unger is substituting his preferences concerning plasticity or rigidity for those of
others).
258.

See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 168-69.

259. Id. at 207.
260.

See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 353-54.

261.

Id. at 354-55.
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as he must speak, in the final analysis, of his values, his norma26 2
tive commitments, and then heads for the stratosphere.
Unger's central tenet is that history is not governed by lawlike constraints, that instead there is an open quality to history. 26 3 That itself is a statement that may be false, or proved
false. Unger supports it by historical examples from "hard"
and "soft" sciences, and stresses that our continued capacity to
imagine and reason precludes the finality of any truth, 2 64 presumably including the one he comes up with. Unger indicates
he cannot necessarily convince the knowledge skeptic. 26 5 He is
correct; he cannot.
The "knowledge problem" was an enormously effective device to "deconstruct" liberal legalism. The basic CLS attack
targets the premises of liberal legalism, concluding that the
goals of liberalism cannot be achieved. More specifically, the
contradiction between the need for and the appropriate fear of
subjection to others cannot be reconciled on an objective basis. But that is because there is no objective basis that we can
know. 2 6 6 So, any system which purported to be based on some
closure, some objective basis for the reconciliation of conflicting interests grand or small, would be doomed to failure. The
appeal of necessitarian argument is that in the legal realm it
justifies or legitimates a given system.
The knowledge problem is not confined to liberalism. For
example, Western legalism and Christianity both must be
based primarily on faith, because the props of 1) assumed ability to mediate contradiction through reason, 2) Natural Law,
and 3) hermeneutics or the theories of interpretation, are in
such disarray that the tower of Babel is a reality. The problems
of hermeneutics spill over to undermine literalism, the mode
of interpretation that accompanies positivism, both in Christian interpretation and Western law. 26 7 Literalism, or plain
meaning interpretations, and the related presupposition that
rules govern cases, remain the prop that particularly Positivist
oriented legalists cling to like drowning sailors.
262. Id.
263. See supra Section II (B)(2)(a).
264. See supra Section II (B)(I).
265. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 354-55.
266. See Van Doren, supra note 253.
267. See Van Doren, Contradiction and Legitimacy in Christianity and United States Constitutionalism, 10 WHItTIER L. REV. 637, 656-61 (1989).
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Unger's approach is like that of the Christian theologian,
Professor Pelikan, who said that method is the only invariable,
the constant in our revisable search for truth. Professor Kelsey, another theologian, concedes the hermeneutic confusion
and frankly faces the knowledge problem. He argues that as
long as one defends one's views, and is purporting to do Christianity in good faith with reference to the Christian texts, that
is sufficient. Interpreters will produce determinant propositions. There is no problem that these diverge or contradict
268
each other.
Unger would agree with Pelikan's assertion that the only
constant is method which incorporates the notion of constant
revisability. There can be no final truth in natural or other science. 269 Unger would not feel himself constrained, however,
by the particularities of documents such as the text of liberalism (the Constitution), because he seeks to modify them substantially. 270 Unger skillfully seeks legitimation from Western
tradition by extracting the goals of freedom, equality, and
friendliness (love?) which are, he might argue, insufficiently realized by the current Constitution. Unger could take the document, the Constitution, as his model, and purport to derive the
working propositions of liberty, equality and fraternity from it.
But he does not do so. Instead, he claims to derive these from
liberal, socialist and communist traditions. Unger then is like a
"Catholic theologian" who consults tradition to find the real
"liberal Gospel." 27 1 He has followed a legitimating model of
consulting tradition, and in Pelikan's terms, has taken a broad
jump from where we are to where we should be going.
As some theologians and politico-legal philosophers are recognizing, ultimate reconciliations must be based on faith in
politics, law and religion.2 72 Western legalists as a whole, however, do not feel they can acknowledge that. Western jurispru268.
269.

See id. at 666.
Id.

270. See, e.g.,

FALSE NECESSITY,

supra note 1, at 457-62.

271. A commentator pursues this parallel more concretely by suggesting that
there are significant similarities between Unger's program for greater equality of distribution and that of Catholic bishops. See generally Powers, Critical Legal Bishops: Roberto Unger, the Catholic Bishops and Distributive Justice, 2 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS, &
PUB. POL'Y 201 (1985) (also pointing out differences).
272. See Smolin, supra note 257, at 448 (Unger fails to make value judgments that
will withstand the rigors of skepticism: we consult religious tradition, history and
empirical data, the voice of our heart and make a leap of faith).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990

43

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 2
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

dence is a testimony to the denial of this central tenet, and is
accordingly obsolete. Unger argues that his system would be
better than the existing one to bridge the gap between selfassertion and the need for, and fear of, dependence on others.
There is a normative commitment here, as there must be. Unger acknowledges that classical liberalism represents an advance over the patron-client social arrangement. 273 He
helpfully focuses on the industrial and commercial economy
with respect to his "property as power" arguments. It is curious that he reserves a survival of the fittest sector where even
274
the mitigating effects of equity are ruled out of bounds.
Ironically, he claims that the contract and property rules would
be clear and capable of positivistic interpretation. 275 Despite
this aberration, Unger's focus on the need to break up power
of property in the market-sector conditions of life, nicely separates the need for property rights as an immunity to citizens
who wish to use it as a buffer between government and private
power over persons. But the question of whether Unger's system can ultimately better reconcile contradictions of our existence in community, is ultimately a matter of faith.
C.

To Participateor Not to Participate:Piecemeal Activity as
Legitimating

Unger encourages deviations within the system such as
small-scale acts of rebellion. He also promotes deviationalist
lawyering, which is pursuing a deviant strain of the inherited
legal tradition, i.e., unconscionability, to advance toward his
alternate view of society. 276 On the other hand, he clearly
seeks major framework changes. He argues that each of those
small-scale rebellions could snowball into major framework
7
change. 27
This approach disregards the problem that participation
within a system may legitimate it, and discourage major
change. 278 Should one work within the existing framework to
273. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 164.
274. Id. at 522-23.
275. Id.
276. See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 147; FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1 at
273-74.
277. See id. at 6.
278. See D. KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW 310-12 (1982) (where there is a tension
reflected between advocacy of changes within the system and non-participation).
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bring about change, or should one hold out for framework
change? The lawyer who attempts to develop unconscionability doctrine may create the expectation that the framework
does not need change. If one follows Unger and pursues the
development of unconscionability, this seems to take the
framework for granted.
A second problem in Unger is this. What really is the difference between pursuing a law case of unconscionability, and being a "Positivist social scientist" studying why women do not
become partners in law firms? Do not social science studies
which show that women often do not make partner in law firms
reflect back on the framework? Then what is the matter with
Positivist social scientists' efforts in, for example, Law and Society? For example, feminists in Law and Society work for
changes within the system. Law and Society adherents, in pursuing the analysis of the gap between liberal ideals and practice, or looking for unexpected facts, e.g., that divorced women
do worse under no fault divorce, 279 may or may not take the
framework for granted. But why is that objectionable within
the Unger world? Do they really neatly fall in the category of
framework preserving and framework challenging?
Missing in Unger is sufficient recognition of the tension between affirming a structure by working in it, and refusing to
participate because participation may retard change. Unger
might say that framework is changed by water dripping on the
rock, by that series of small rebellions that could crystalize. 2 0
However, while endorsing the efforts to achieve some changes,
he denigrates some small changes, such as those he refers to as
resulting from reform cycles. 28 l Are small changes, or rebellions complementary to major change by the snowball effect,
or do they inappropriately reinforce the current framework, as,
e.g., the movement within the reform cycles do?
Unger thus slides over the problem that working within a
system tends to support the system and legitimate it. In short,
activists in South Africa take the view that there should be no
participation in the political bromides that are being offered a
279. See, e.g., R. EISLER, DISSOLUTION No FAULT DIVORCE, MARRIAGE AND THE FuTURE OF WOMEN 40 (1977) (women are in many ways victims of no fault divorce).
280. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 59, 268, 273 (low level disagreements
may escalate).
281. See id. at 12 ("Only proposals that are hardly worth fighting for-reformist
tinkering-seem practicable.").
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basically disenfranchised black majority. If South African
Blacks were to adopt Unger's deviationalist theory that the
doctrines representing a countervision should be pursued in
the legal system, 282 they, counterproductively, would be legitimating the system.
Unger also seems on a collision course with certain propositions which have emerged from the Frankfurt school of learning. It has been pointed out, for instance, that the makers of
popular culture reinforce the patterns of subjection; and by offering the example of persons who make it within the system,
ruling groups seek to coopt or seduce away potentially radical
activity. 28 3 This is the best explanation of the situation left

open by Unger: why there is no rebellion against privilege in
the United States. Unger states that we should exploit the Horatio Alger images to achieve what equality we can. This seems
to be contradictory to the approach of the Frankfurt school
which seeks to bring out the conservative implications of popu2 84
lar culture which in Unger's terms reinforce the framework.
A fundamental question remains: should one hold out for a
quantum leap and not legitimate the existing order, or should
one seek the "quantum leap" piecemeal? If any deviation or
defiance of framework could escalate, that is an argument for
defying the system or pursuing a counter-dominant ideal. But
in some circumstances, participation will further buttress an inappropriate framework, and give the illusion of change without
285
the substance.
D.

Models of Human Association

Unger argues that the mass of legal material in liberalism
does not reflect a defensible scheme of human association.
First, the liberal conception is contradictory. 286 Second, it is
not revisable; it represents itself falsely as natural, closed and
final. 2 87 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the liberal con282. Id. at 555.
283. See Van Doren, Critical Legal Studies and South Africa, supra note 23.
284. See id.
285. See, e.g., Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be
Saved?, 97 YALE LJ. 923, 933 (1988) (race law gives illusion of progress and legitimates oppressive society).
286. See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 148.
287. See supra Section I (D).
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ception is morally wrong, as constituted. 28 8 Unger's attack is
directed against "objectivism," which is the idea that the current arrangements concerning "market" and "democracy" and
the underlying components of the legal system (cases, statutes
and legal concepts) are the unique way of expressing the desired form of human association. 289 Thus, Unger and CLS
maintain that there is no possible objective resolution of adjudicative conflict.
There is indeterminacy at the levels of doctrine, policy and
the basic liberal conception of state, family and market. To
resolve doctrinal inconsistency, resort must be made to the
policy level. Since the policy level is also indeterminate, there
is a third level of thought to resolve matters, the liberal form of
human association. 290 The reason that no model of human association solves the conflicts on the doctrinal and policy level is
due to the fact that the three spheres, market, private (family
and friendships), and public (state) lack boundaries that hold.
Consequently, principles that are present in one area are applied in the other areas. Thus, freedom of speech from the
political area could be applied to the business area for whistle
29 1
blowers.
Unger may be saying that each sphere, market, public, and
private, unduly isolates persons from others and from the best
in themselves. 292 He might add that there is in liberalism so
much contradiction, i.e., conflicting models of human association, and so much overlap, actual and potential, that there is
no center to hold. On the other hand, there is a dominant ideology based on individualism. Thus, in Unger's scheme, is the
problem that the existing liberal model is flawed, or is it that
there is no recognizable model at all due to contradiction?
The real attack is normative: the current liberal model is the
wrong model. Unger finds the liberal social arrangements are
based on happenstance, such as legislative power plays and adjudicative compromise that just reflect where the fighting
288. See supra Section 11 (C).
289. See Pannier, Roberto Unger and the Critical Legal Studies Movement: An Examination
and Evaluation, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 647, 659-60 (1987).
290. See Collins, supra note 26, at 396-98; SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 147.
291. See Collins, supra note 26, at 396-407; FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at

273-74 (both supporting this paragraph).
292. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 1, at 273-74.
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stops. 29 3 The argument over what is a defensible form of
human association constitutes the crux of the current dispute
between Dworkin, Unger and CLS. 2 94 Dworkin's model judge
has a theory of the form of human association to resolve
disputes.
But if liberal defenders argue that there is a dominant
model, they must answer Unger's claims in Knowledge and Politics that it is riddled with contradiction. The liberal model does
not resolve the fundamental contradictions, it "balances"
them, that is, makes some decision ad hoc between two poles,
responsive to no objective determinant. Unger could continue
with the argument that there is no necessary resolution, no
uniquely correct liberal model of association.
A defender of the liberal order has answered that there is
not a necessary resolution, say in contracts, but a defensible one
nonetheless. 29 5 Finnis indicates that Unger is unclear on
whether the indeterminacy of, e.g., "market," is a problem because it is empty and vacuous, or because the indeterminate
concept does not give rise to any rules, such as those which
exist in United States contract law. 29 6 "Fair" market relations
might be defended even though the United State's version
might not be the unique way to structure them. 29 7 Moreover,
there can be some resolutions which are true to parts of the
concept, and yet not be the unique ones.2 9 8 Thus, a liberal
defender could answer Unger by saying that contradiction
does not prevent a dominant model from surfacing. While this
is a major anti-necessitarian concession, it is an answer to Unger's contention that the liberal order cannot resolve the contradictions in its own terms. But the question boils down to
this: Are the "fair" market relations more fair to some than
others? This takes us back to the knowledge problem and normative commitments. How could one ever "resolve" it?
Thus, there seems to be an unresolved contradiction in Unger's thought between casting the dominant liberal ideology as
293. See id. at 265, 555 (tension between legislation of interest group politics and
the impersonal ideal).
294. See R. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 271-75 (1986). See also supra note 74.
295. See Finnis, On "'The Critical Legal Studies Movement", 30 AM. J. JURIS. 21, 23

(1985).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 37-38.
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one which is able to be perceived but wrong, and the idea that
contradiction prevents one from emerging at all. What is left
is the normative Ungerian claim that the liberal dominant ideology does not square with its theoretical model, i.e., we are
supposed to be free, equal, and friendly, but structural arrangements do not allow that. The debate then is between
models, which goes back to fact/value, normative problems.
Unger, in the final analysis, gives us a method. When he says
that all is politics, and proposes the use of deviationist doctrine, what guarantee is there that there will be anything but
contingent happenstance when revisability, which is after all,
only a technique, is followed? Unger could and does reply that
he never promised you a rose garden. He invites you to share
his faith: if you remove unnecessary constraints, persons will
be freer and good will triumph. Which, by the way, is all anyone else can offer you, their faith.
If we extract two reasons for explanation of why the liberal
model fails, we have: 1) interpersonal relations operate at a
level where trust results in betrayal; and 2) the operation of the
market results in subjection. Unger's model addresses the second, but does not satisfactorily address the first. Unger's presumption that love will flourish if institutional barriers
preventing accessibility of persons to one another are removed
is a major leap.
CONCLUSION

Professor Unger has done us a great service by continuing to
take us into the controversial dimensions of theory of knowledge, political theory, and economics to name a few. Where
many of us have faltered for lack of vision or courage, he has
advanced. Just to elevate the discussion from the statute of
limitations to forms of human association is a tremendous advance. His alternative vision puts us to the test.
Unger has raised our vision from our myopia in the narrow
world of adjudication into the taboo (for law professors) arena
of broad politics and ethics, largely ceded by lawyers to the
political scientists and philosophers. By asking how we are
constrained, how we constrain ourselves, who we are, and what
we really might be, Unger, in a superlative effort, greatly stimulates our vision of the possible.
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